Category Archives: South Sudan

South Sudan Post-Independence: Things Fall Apart

(Originally published in War on the Rocks on July 17, 2014)

Three years into its independence, South Sudan faces multiple crises on political, security, and humanitarian fronts. After almost a decade of relative peace following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with Sudan in 2005, a political dispute within South Sudan’s ruling party, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), devolved into armed conflict in December 2013. The jubilance and optimism that accompanied the new country’s independence from Sudan in July 2011 were eroded; in their wake, prospects for a peace dividend have become bleak.

This was not the war that many had anticipated following the signing of the CPA and South Sudan’s subsequent independence. That war would have been a reprise of North–South conflict that characterized the first (1956–1972) and second (1983–2005) Sudanese civil wars. Rather, the conflict that emerged in South Sudan could be understood as a continuation of unresolved South–South tensions that were, arguably, never adequately addressed by the CPA. Contrary to its name, the CPA was an elite bargain between Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party and the strongest element of the southern resistance, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A).

(Read the rest of the article on the War on the Rocks website)

Bentiu changes hands for the 4th time

UPDATE as of 9am EST: Sudan Tribune reports that SPLM-IO has claimed to have recaptured Bentiu, while the government of South Sudan claims the SPLA is defending their positions in the town from rebel fighter.

 

In case you missed it, Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment released some new briefs last week on the ongoing conflict in South Sudan. In light of today’s reports that the city of Bentiu, capital of (formerly) oil-producing Unity State has once again changed hands, I would direct your attention to The SPLM-in-Opposition and The Conflict in Unity.

Today’s developments mark the fourth time since the outset of conflict in December 2013 that Bentiu has changed hands between the government and the rebel forces, the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO). The SPLM-IO first seized the town the week the conflict broke out around 20-21 December and held it until it was retaken by the government on 10 January. Bentiu again fell to the opposition on 15 April, but was retaken by the government on 4 May. Both times the SPLM-IO has taken Bentiu, they have only been able to hold it for a maximum of 3 weeks. Why has that been the case?

For the answers to that question, I turn to the aforementioned Sudan HSBA briefs, which were on the money about the relative weakness of the rebellion in Unity, when compared with its relative strength in Upper Nile State to the east. One reason it’s been difficult for the SPLM-IO to hold Bentiu is that Unity State is exposed to President Salva Kiir’s homeland region on Bahr el Ghazal, from which the SPLA 3rd Division (Northern Bahr el Ghazal) and SPLA 5th Division (Western Bahr el Ghazal) can reinforce the SPLA in Unity. Second, the South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA), a mainly Nuer former rebel group which had accepted the government’s amnesty prior to the outbreak of conflict and had been awaiting integration into the SPLA, sided with the government, which not only provided the government with additional manpower, but also forced the Nuer soldiers in Unity to decide between remaining with the government and the SSLA or defecting to the SPLM-IO.

Despite the signing of the cessation of hostilities in January, which was never honored and, quite frankly, isn’t worth the paper it was printed on, we will continue to see the government of South Sudan and the SPLM-IO strengthen their positions before the imminent onset of rainy season and before peace talks gain any real traction. Meanwhile, Toby Lanzer, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for South Sudan estimated via Twitter that approximately 6 million people (2/3 the population of South Sudan) will be at severe risk of starvation or will have fled their homes by the end of 2014.

Never a dull moment with the SPLA…

Although I’m writing this from my cushy office in northern Virgina, It seemed like relative calm had returned, at least, to Juba after the outbreak of violence across parts of South Sudan in mid-December. (For background on the roots of the current crisis, see Radio Tamazuj’s Nine questions about the South Sudan crisis: A guide for confused observers and South Sudan crisis: A guide for confused observers (II).) However, gunfire broke out at the SPLA barracks at Giada, which was also apparently the same barracks in Juba where the mid-December gunfights started. The cause of this morning’s fighting, in which at least five soldiers were killed, appears to have been a dispute over pay, and may have involved some soldiers from Salva Kiir’s presidential guard, the Tiger Division. Brig. Gen. Malaak Ayuen, an SPLA spokeman, stated “This is purely an issue of salaries. It is not political and will not spread… Soldiers have not been paid since January, why I don’t know, and went to the commander seeking answers.”

It appears that a new procedure for distributing salaries was the cause of this morning’s dispute. The Government of South Sudan had created a new payment system to prevent the payment of SPLA salaries to “ghost soldiers,” thereby requiring soldiers to collect their payments in person. Cabinet affairs minister Martin Elia Lomoru stated ““The whole intention was for the good of the country. It was not meant to deny anybody their rightful dues…the intention was to build confidence in our financial systems so that the issue of transparency and accountability is not ignored.” From the few media reports of the events surrounding this brief outbreak of violence, it appears that miscommunications about this procedure prompted the gunfight as soldiers were queued waiting for their payments.

Like the mid-December gunfights in Juba, it’s very difficult to piece together what exactly happened, but the three most helpful news sources I’ve seen thus far have been:

I’m not an expert on military compensation, but when you have segments of the military that, as one security consultant previously described it to me, are being paid not to fight the government, it’s probably best to make sure they’re paid within a reasonable period of time. Especially when you might need them to (re)establish the government’s monopoly on the use of force and retake territory held by anti-government rebels. Just a thought…

Museveni plays peacemaker by day and combatant by night in South Sudan

(Originally published in African Arguments on January 31, 2014)

Within days of the outbreak of the violence in mid-December, the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) deployed to South Sudan at the government’s invitation. The UPDF’s mission at the outset was ostensibly to evacuate the over 200,000 stranded Ugandan nationals and to secure strategic installations in Juba. However, several weeks into the operation, President Yoweri Museveni disclosed that the UPDF was also involved in combat operations alongside government forces.

Indeed, the UPDF’s helicopter gunships, heavy artillery, tanks, and approximately 1,600 soldiers have been instrumental in helping the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) retake cities held by anti-government forces affiliated with former Vice President Riek Machar. In a motion passed in the Ugandan parliament to retroactively approve UPDF operations, the UPDF’s raison d’être in South Sudan was couched in terms of protecting the Ugandan expatriate community, ensuring Ugandan national security, and preventing genocide and other atrocities against humanity.

Nevertheless, the manner in which Uganda is securing its interests compromises concurrent efforts on the part of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), of which Uganda is a member, to mediate the crisis.

(Read the rest of the article on the African Arguments website)

Cessation of Hostilities (or Ceasefire Lite) signed for South Sudan

Yesterday in Addis, a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement was signed between the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement / Army in Opposition (SPLM/A in Opposition). The agreement enters into force 24 hours from the time at which it was signed. Contrary to what some media are reporting, this Cessation of Hostilities is not the same as a Ceasefire, and I would recommend reading this very informative Watch International post on the lexicon of peace agreements to understand the difference between the two. That said, an astute fellow analyst has pointed out that the Cessation of Hostilities has some elements of a Ceasefire:

“Practically, since this agreement also includes provisions for a joint monitoring and verification mission, it mirrors a lot of the components of a ceasefire. However, unlike a lot of ceasefires, it doesn’t call for the United Nations to be involved in monitoring violations. Instead, it leaves that in the hands of the two parties, plus their mediator, the regional IGAD organization.”

Therefore, it may be more appropriate to refer to this Cessation of Hostilities as a Diet Ceasefire or Ceasefire Lite - to use the technical terminology of the field.

The signing of this Cessation of Hostilities raises many questions on the way ahead, which I will pose below:

  1. Is the SPLM/A in Opposition as cohesive as it’s made to appear in the agreement? I’ve long doubted that Riek Machar has a monopoly on anti-government force since the crisis started last month, and the SPLM/A in Opposition may not be able to control violence perpetrated by SPLA defectors General Peter Gadet or General James Koang Chuol or by the resurgent White Army, which has vowed to fight on. In fact, there’s a chance that SPLA defectors and members of ethnically-defined localized armed groups may see no benefit in adhering to a Cessation of Hostilities between political elites.
  2. What comes after the Cessation of Hostilities? It is very important to recognize that the Cessation of Hostilities is not a peace agreement that spells out political and military power-sharing arrangements, reconciliation initiatives, and plans for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR). Rather, it’s better to think of the Cessation of Hostilities as a “Time Out” that effectively freezes parties to armed conflict in place, requires them to disengage from fighting, and allows for humanitarian access. I think the Cessation of Hostilities is an enabler that at least gets the warring parties apart long enough to set up a formal peace process that could address these deeper issues.
  3. Who are the guarantors to this Cessation of Hostilities? Although this is not a peace agreement, I think we can draw some insights from that body of academic literature. Glassmyer and Sambanis (“Rebel-Military Integration and Civil War Termination,” Journal of Peace Research, May 2008 vol. 45 no. 3, pp. 365-384) and Hoddie and Hartzell (“Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing Agreements, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 40, no. 3, 2003, pp. 303-320) argue that the presence of third-party actors can verify compliance with the terms of a peace agreement and can act as guarantors of security. In some cases – and I would argue that South Sudan is one of them – third-party actors need to have the diplomatic clout to convene warring parties and ensure implementation and the military power to deter or physically separate warring parties if the agreement falls apart. In the present case of South Sudan, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) which brokered the talks, is responsible for setting up a Joint Technical Committee (JTC) which will establish a Monitoring and Verification Team (MVT) that is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the agreement. However, the issue of who can provide a military deterrent is unclear. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is not mentioned in the Cessation of Hostilities, but even if it was, UNMISS is still in the process of receiving the additional 5,500 soldiers and 440 police to strengthen the mission, plus GRSS is in a war of words with UNMISS over what it perceives to be the UN’s impartiality in South Sudan. IGAD has also approved a 5,500 person force to be sent to South Sudan, and there is a chance that this force could consist of IGAD member states but contribute to the new UNMISS mandated force strength. However, the problem with IGAD troop contributors is that they may be perceived as impartial like Sudan or (Ahem!) Uganda, or like Kenya and Ethiopia, may be militarily overextended due to their commitments to other peacekeeping missions. That leaves Djibouti and Somalia as potential troop contributors to an IGAD force, so I’m just going to hazard a guess and say that by default, UNMISS will have to be the military guarantor of the Cessation of Hostilities -  or there will be no guarantor at all.
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