Dear Readers,

Earlier this week, I was in Chad (African Country B). And I’m gonna come right out and say it – I had little to no involvement in the apparent coup attempt  that may or may not have occurred in the Chadian capital of N’Djamena yesterday.

Although news is still emerging about this attempt to ”destabilize the institutions of the republic,” here’s what we know:

• Two senior generals (Weiddig Assi Assoue and Ngomine Beadmadji David), a member of parliament allied to President Idriss Déby (Mahamat Malloum Kadre), and a member of the opposition (Saleh Maki) have been taken into custody. 
• Between four and eight people were killed in fighting at a military barracks east of N’Djamena.

So in sum, there’s still a lot we don’t know. As an external observer, there are two conclusions I’ve come to:

1. If there was an opportune time to launch a coup in Chad, now’s the time. If there was a coup-plotter’s equivalent to the well-known poem “To the Virgins, to Make Much of Time” (from which the oft-quoted phrase “Gather ye rosebuds while ye may” comes) this would be it. What I mean is, with 2,000 of his best assault forces currently deployed in northern Mali, Déby is more vulnerable than he would be if they were not over 1500 miles away. With the president publicly signaling that these forces may be withdrawn from northern Mali, the time to unseat him would be before these forces returned home. In March, Timan Erdimi, exiled leader of the Union of Forces of Resistance (UFR) threatened to renew its previous rebellion, apparently over discontent that peace talks had never taken place. (I must caveat, though, that at present I have no indication as to who might have been behind yesterday’s disturbances). Erdimi, who is also Déby’s nephew, was a member of the coalition that almost toppled Déby in February 2008 by sweeping west across the country in a matter of days, laying siege to the presidential palace for two days before retreating east. Déby was rescued by French intervention – the French military presence of 1,000 troops and associated support elements, which already existed at the time, continuing to provide a guarantor of regime stability to this day.
2. Yesterday’s events could simply be a regime-manufactured part of the larger game Déby has been playing with the international community since Chad entered the fight in Mali several months ago. Chad is well aware that it was the only African country that was capable of rapidly deploying highly capable assault forces to halt the January 2013 Islamist offensive into southern Mali. However, it appears that the international community has not, in turn, demonstrated its gratitude. With Chad hundreds of millions of dollars in the red over its Mali deployment, it may behoove Déby to demonstrate how much he could really use that influx of cash so that he could afford to sustain Chadian troops in Mali for the benefit of regional & global security. (For great analysis on Déby’s great game with the international community, see Celeste Hicks and Alex Thurston).

Anyway, that’s my take on things. I’m headed to African Country C tomorrow, and it’s already shaping up to be quite an eventful week.

]]> http://lesleyannewarner.wordpress.com/2013/05/02/what-i-was-not-doing-in-african-country-b-chads-recent-alleged-coup-attempt/feed/ 2 warner225 http://lesleyannewarner.wordpress.com/2013/05/01/what-i-did-in-african-country-a-niger/ http://lesleyannewarner.wordpress.com/2013/05/01/what-i-did-in-african-country-a-niger/#comments Wed, 01 May 2013 22:52:30 +0000 Lesley Anne Warner http://lesleyannewarner.wordpress.com/?p=1035 ]]> On occasion, I write about my experience traveling in Africa – to add an entertaining counterweight to my more analytical rants and musings on the events unfolding on the continent. The following is about my current travel covering parts of Africa and Europe.

Dear Readers,

The jig is up! I’ve moved on from African Country A, which I wrote a bit about last week, so I can now tell you that I was in Niger. I got to do several cool things while I was there.

Niger River at Sunset

First, I got to be a fly on the wall during meetings with representatives of the youth movement, NGOs, and the media. There, I was privy to Nigerien civil society perspectives on the country’s trajectory, including the proactive measures President Mahamadou Issoufou had taken to mitigate spillover from instability in Libya and Mali, the country’s youth bulge and why youth engagement is so critical, fears over the spread of violent extremism from northern Nigeria into Maradi and Zinder, and instances of complicity in narcotrafficking among segments of the Nigerien political class.

Later in the week, I had the opportunity to observe a simulation of a hostage rescue by the Nigerien gendarmes.

Gendarmes prepare for hostage rescue simulation

During the simulation, I wandered into the structure where the “terrorists” were holding the “hostages,” not entirely aware that a full-scale assault was imminent. In the video that I took (which I’ve decided not to post here), you see the gendarmes entering, shooting two blanks, and the camera (held by me) diving instinctively towards the ground. What is not seen or heard in the video is my soft and slightly panicked whimpering. Later on, I got to see how the unit apprehended some of the terrorists who escaped the initial operation, searched their vehicle, and had an evidence collection unit process the scene. Since I don’t have a law enforcement background and the United States doesn’t have an equivalent to gendarmerie, it was pretty cool to see how the simulation played out from start to finish.

Gendarmerie stops fleeing terrorists during simulation

I insisted on visiting the Musée National du Niger, and although most of the pavilions were closed at the time, I did get to preview a forthcoming exhibit on the traditional dress of Niger’s Hausa, Songhai, and Tuareg populations. I also visited the Grande Mosquée de Niamey, which was very beautiful and offered a great view of part of the city from the minaret.

(Part of the) Grande Mosquée de Niamey

On my last night in Niamey, I was the guest speaker at the English Language Club at the U.S. Embassy’s American Cultural Center. I opened the session by talking about my identity as a first-generation American and then opened the session up to questions from the Nigerien audience. And let me tell you – these people gave me a run for my money! They asked me questions that covered topics from the patriotism and ethnic identity among other first generation Americans to gay rights to gun control to the politics of the climate change discourse in the United States. At the end, one of the participants asked me what I thought of Niamey and if I would return. “I’ve found Niamey quite charming, and YES I must return and experience more of the country.” I responded. “I’ve only just scratched the surface!” 

I’ve started my one month long, six country tour that will have me in African Country A, France, African Country B, Germany, African Country C, and African Country D before I head back to the States in mid-May. Since this is my first time in Country A, I’ve naturally been inclined to seek out some sort of familiarity to the city I’m in based on where I’ve traveled before. The city is dusty, hot, conservative, pleasant, refined. It makes me think that this city would be the outcome if Yaoundé, Cameroon and Tamale, Ghana had a lovechild.

Upon arrival, I could tell that the immigration officer who stamped my passport  suspected that I was an International Woman of Mystery based on the assortment of seemingly random visas and passport stamps. He looks up and asks ”Qu’est-ce que votre profession – exactement?” I fumble for the words for ‘one who researches national security’ since my default foreign language is, and will always be, Portuguese. That’s what comes from studying abroad in a Lusophone country rather than a Francophone one.

I muscle my way out of baggage claim and customs only to find no placard with my name on it held by any of my in-country points of contact. After about 10 minutes, the same immigration officer walks by and asks why I haven’t been picked up. I respond that I’m “hoping for” (vs “waiting for”) a driver from my hotel. Damn you French verbs. He disappears and a woman comes over asking me if I’m Anna. (I go by Anne or Anna when I travel, since most people simply ignore or can’t be bothered with pronouncing Lesley). She apologizes for not finding me earlier, saying “Anna! Nous cherchions une blanche!” (We were looking for a white woman.) We share a laugh as she escorts me to the hotel shuttle.

After checking in, the bellhop helps me up to my room with the luggage, but first we have a showdown with the elevator. As it turns out, the door militantly closes on occupants if they do not enter or leave the elevator in a timely fashion. I watch in terror as the door assaults an unsuspecting European guest. An African guest asks me “Avez-vous peur de notre pays?” (Are you afraid of our country?) I respond “Non, mais j’ai peur de l’ascenseur!” (No, but I’m afraid of the elevator!) Once we’re all safely packed in the elevator, the man asks where I’m from and what I’m doing there. I quickly realize that my usual cover story when I’m abroad – that I’m Trinidadian and I’m traveling as a tourist – doesn’t hold up at all in this place. I dislike having to explain what I do since I always get that ‘are you sure you’re not a spy’ side-glance. I manage to deflect his questions, which is easy enough b/c this dude loves talking about himself and the fact that he’s here to visit his former classmate who’s now the president.

The following day, I started my meetings and peeked in on a conference on regional security where I learned about interoperability between the local military and law enforcement in French. I don’t speak military French, so I was pretty thrilled to be able to understand what was going on. Later on, I asked to visit the museum, where I got a preview of an exhibit on the traditional dress of Country A’s various ethnic groups. By night I enjoyed brochettes de viande that were quite good, mostly because meat actually has flavor outside the U.S. And now it’s time for bed, since I have a long day of tagging along on meetings with civil society ahead of me. Also, the power keeps going out.

U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) was established in 2008 due to growing awareness of Africa’s strategic significance to U.S. interests and international security. AFRICOM was presented as a new type of combatant command that would address traditional and human security threats through a pioneering interagency approach and structure, in addition to partner capacity building. AFRICOM would integrate significant numbers of personnel from the State Department, USAID, and other interagency organizations. U.S. officials asserted this would allow the command to address the root causes and, ultimately, prevent conflict and instability.

The creation of AFRICOM, the complexity of its mission, and the threats present in the region give rise to questions regarding AFRICOM’s impact in executing U.S. national security policy in Africa, addressing human security issues, and its ability to foster a positive image of itself and U.S. national security policy. To explore these issues, my Master’s thesis research is a case study of Tanzania. I chose Tanzania as a case study on AFRICOM because I felt that it is an often overlooked actor in the East African security environment. I was also interested in examining how AFRICOM currently engages with African states not engaged in an ongoing conflict and its ability to foster bi-lateral relations with a state that has, at times, had a strained relationship with the U.S.

While often overshadowed by neighboring states Tanzania’s long-standing stability, history of mediating regional conflicts (most notably the Burundian civil war), contributions to peacekeeping missions, and hosting of regional and international organization such as the East African Community (EAC) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), make it an important actor in the often volatile East Africa region. Yet Tanzania faces similar threats as its neighbors including illicit narcotic trafficking, piracy, and terrorism. Tanzania also faces pervasive threats to human security. As one of the world’s poorest countries, economic development fails to reach the majority of the population, resulting in poor health and education systems, as well as the world’s 12^th highest HIV/AIDS infection rate.

A strategic U.S.-Tanzanian relationship is critical for countering the threats Tanzania faces and bolstering the country’s capacity to address ongoing regional conflicts and humanitarian crises. This research seeks to answer three questions: What is the impact of AFRICOM in executing U.S. national security policy in Tanzania? How and to what extent has AFRICOM addressed the conditions of human insecurity? Does AFRICOM foster a positive public perception within Tanzania?

The initial findings have shown that Tanzania extensively engages with AFRICOM through its security cooperation programs and exercises. Former AFRICOM Commander Gen. Carter Ham singled out this partnership in his recent remarks to the Senate Armed Services Committee stating, “We are deepening our relationship with the Tanzanian military, a professional force whose capabilities and influence increasingly bear on regional security issues in eastern and southern Africa and the Great Lakes region.” Indeed, Tanzania’s contribution of troops to the recently authorized UN offensive combat force in Eastern Congo illustrates the important peace and security role the country plays in the region and the necessity of its military having the capacity to fulfill this role.

In terms of how and to what extent AFRICOM addresses Tanzania’s human security issues, this research has found the command’s activities fit those of a more traditional combatant command; emphasizing military-to-military partner capacity building and engagement. While many of AFRICOM’s programs (MEDCAP, Partner Military HIV/AIDS, Pandemic Response, and VETCAP) focus on human security related issues, they are directed at the Tanzanian military. Regarding public perceptions, Tanzanians have more knowledge and interest than I was led to believe would be the case with public opinion of AFRICOM oscillating between negative and neutral.

Tanzania faces significant security threats both internally and regionally. Although these initial findings have not found that AFRICOM is addressing human security issues in the broader population, AFRICOM is building the Tanzanian military’s capacity to address and prevent instability and conflict, serving Tanzanian, regional, and U.S. security interests.

• Introduction: Why Africa Matters to the United States by Mwangi Kimenyi
• Advancing Peace and Security in Africa by Lesley Anne Warner
• China in Africa: Implications for U.S. Competition and Diplomacy by Yun Sun
• Key Sub-Saharan Energy Trends and their Importance for the U.S. by John P. Banks
• Transforming the U.S.-Africa Commercial Relationship by Witney Schneidman
• U.S. Development Assistance and Sub-Saharan Africa: Opportunities for Engagement by George Ingram and Steven Rocker

In my section on Advancing Peace and Security in Africa, I argue that the United States should:

1. Rebalance U.S. engagement with African countries so that it is more proactive than reactive.
2. Establish multi-year funding authorities for building partner capacity programs.
3. Address the deficient capabilities of African law enforcement personnel.
4. Continue to support regional and sub-regional mechanisms for conflict resolution.
5. Use ongoing insecurity in the Sahel as an impetus to re-evaluate the scope of U.S. military engagement on the continent.

Hope you get a chance to take a look at both the remainder of my section and those of my fellow contributors!

In early January 2013, South African President Jacob Zuma authorized the deployment of 400 SANDF to help train the Central African Republic Armed Forces (FACA), as well as assist in the planning and implementation of the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process. (Apparently, only 200 troops had been deployed thus far). Potential reasons for the SANDF deployment to the Central African Republic vary. On one hand, it may be a natural progression of South Africa’s pursuit of regional influence on the continent, and perhaps a way to counter French influence. On the other, South Africa may have commercial interests in the Central African Republic.

The deployment was in accordance with the provisions of section 201 (2) (c) of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, which states that “Only the President, as head of the national executive, may authorize the employment of the defence force in fulfillment of an international obligation.” The international obligation to which the constitution referred was, in this case, a five-year military cooperation agreement initially signed between South Africa and the Central African Republic in 2007, and renewed in December 2012.

In early January, a SANDF spokesperson stated that the purpose of the SANDF deployment was not to engage rebel fighters, but to train the FACA. Accordingly, they were not combat-equipped, making them vulnerable to attack and likely to suffer heavy casualties if Séléka engaged them in battle – which they did when Séléka broke the ceasefire as a result of Bozizé’s unwillingness to implement the terms of the peace agreement. During the course of Séléka’s push towards Bangui, 13 SANDF were killed, seven were wounded, and one is missing in action. The South African National Defence Force Union (SANDU) subsequently released a statement condemning the involvement of the SANDF and asserting that the deployment should have been curtailed the moment Bozizé showed signs of not honoring the January 2013 Libreville agreements. In a press conference on Monday, Zuma stated that troop casualties were suffered whilst SANDF was defending a South African military base outside Bangui, stating “Wherever our troops are deployed they have the duty to defend themselves if their positions fall under attack.”

The events of this past weekend cast a shadow upon the previously constructive role South Africa has played with regard to conflict resolution in Africa, and taints its image as a neutral broker for future peace agreements on the continent. South Africa’s experience transitioning from apartheid to democracy provides a prime example of a peaceful transition that occurred on the heels of a deeply divisive period of history. Yet, Zuma’s decision to deploy the SANDF in support of the Bozizé regime has negated South Africa’s ability to present itself as a nonpartisan broker between Séléka and remnants of the ancien régime.

Over the weekend, the Séléka rebel alliance seized Bangui, capital of the Central African Republic (CAR). This most recent offensive was the latest development in a rebellion that commenced in December 2012 over President François Bozizé’s failure to implement the 2007 Birao Peace Agreement and the 2008 Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In those deals, Bozizé’s government had agreed to provide amnesty for former combatants; to pursue the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of the rebel forces; to provide compensation for those demobilized and the integration of some former rebels into the official armed forces of the Central African Republic; and to share political power. But with little if any progress made since the signing of these agreements, it was only a matter of time before the conflict reignited.

Between 1,000 and 2,000 Séléka fighters swept across the country in December, coming within 40 miles of Bangui before Bozizé and Séléka agreed to peace negotiations mediated by the Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC). Entering the talks in January 2013, Séléka’s demands included the release of political prisoners, the withdrawal of foreign troops sent to assist the Bozizé regime and Bozizé’s immediate resignation. A new set of agreements – a cease-fire, a declaration of principles, and a peace agreement– were hastily negotiated and signed in Libreville, Gabon, on Jan. 11, stipulating that Bozizé would remain in power until the end of his term in 2016 and putting in place a unity government for a renewable period of 12 months. This government would include members of the political and military opposition, and among its tasks would be to restore peace and security, organize new legislative elections in anticipation of the dissolution of the National Assembly and conduct DDR and security sector reform with assistance from the international community. Unsurprisingly to most observers, the Libreville agreement was never implemented.

(Read the rest of the article on the World Politics Review website)

On Sequestration:

At several points of the hearing, there were discussions centered around the need for the Department of Defense (DoD) to determine how, in an era of budget cuts, the military should be postured to respond to crises on the continent.

• When asked how AFRICOM could increase response time while maintaining a relatively small footprint, General Ham responded that we (I’m unclear if he was referring to the United States in general or AFRICOM in particular) are much better at prevention than response. He further stated that prevention is much cheaper, but necessitates a better understanding of the operating environment - hence the preoccupation with increasing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.
• Earlier in the hearing, General Ham had been asked about reductions in flight hours that have already resulted from sequestration, and have impacted the Command’s ISR capabilities. In his response, he mentioned that most operations are funded by the services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Special Operations) through their components of AFRICOM. Two of these components, U.S. Air Forces, Africa (USAFAF) and U.S. Naval Forces, Africa (USNAVAF), have had to constrain their flight operations due to service component funding challenges. General Ham further explained that he’d asked the USAFAF commander to maintain the component’s transport aircraft in a heightened alert posture so that they could move crisis response forces more readily. This, however, requires that the component sustain flight crews on a heightened alert posture, which cuts into normal training and sustainment flights. As a result, the component was having trouble funding both requirements. Similarly, the Navy has had to decrease the frequency of some of its operational reconnaissance flights – again because of the inability to fund its normal flight operations.

General Ham was asked if he was seeing the financial impact of budget cuts on AFRICOM’s U.S. government partners, given that some of AFRICOM’s roles are shared by the State Department, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), etc. He replied that he has seen an impact on the non-Department of Defense (DoD) assets upon which they depend, and implied that if sequestration continued for the balance of the year, that there would be very real consequences on what the State Department would be able to deliver.

When asked about the impact of sequestration on AFRICOM’s ability to train African militaries, General Ham replied that budget cuts may cause some exercises and training to fall by the wayside. A potential upside, however, was that this may lead AFRICOM to seek out opportunities for multinational building partner capacity engagements, since most training has been bilateral. (Here, I’m assuming he was talking about greater collaboration with European allies in Africa.) He also said that with sequestration, DoD may need to revisit last January’s Defense Strategic Guidance.

Finally, a member of the SASC asked if sequestration would precipitate a shift in AFRICOM’s strategy, General Ham replied that he didn’t believe such a shift would give primacy to the use of U.S. forces in military interventions. He explained that although it may be faster to use U.S. military forces, the use of such forces would be counterintuitive because it would ultimately increase the long-term the demands on the U.S. military. The current building partner capacity approach, on the other hand, allows the United States to rely on other nations, thus reducing the demand for U.S. forces.

There were some other interesting parts of the hearing that did not directly relate to crisis response operations or sequestration, but I’ll sum those up in another post later this week.